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All European lawyers are well acquainted with the fact that American
civil procedure is different from the Code we celebrate at this
conference. A few years ago, the German Minister of Justice
proclaimed that America has a “lousy legal system.”
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And anyone

acquainted with the differences would acknowledge that the
institutions drawn from European civil code traditions are much more
efficient than is the American system when it comes to resolving
private disputes.

If America were more homogeneous and were served by a
democratic parliamentary government responsive to the concerns of
all those it governed, few would doubt the United States would be
better served by a civil process more similar to that provided by the
civil code. But the distinctive features of American law explaining the
Minister’s assessment were and are indispensable to such
democracy as we enjoy in the United States today.
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In parliamentary governments serving smaller populations sharing a
greater measure of public trust, it may well be best to depend largely,
as Europeans generally have, on bureaucracies and prosecutors for
the enforcement of laws enacted to protect workers, consumers,
individual investors, debtors, patients, and the environment.
It is indeed my impression that the bureaucracies overseen by many
European parliaments are reasonably effective at enforcing most
public laws.

But in America, the distinction between public and private law
is muddled. Of course we have bureaucracies and some are
reasonably effective. Business says to excess. But American
governments seldom rely fully on their own officials to protect their
concerns. We urge private citizens to help government regulate
business. Private rights are created for public purposes.

Reasons for this can be found in the history of our nation. Given the
similarities between 19th century America and the present state of the
world, the novelties of American law might be taken to suggest
issues worthy of consideration by any future planners of globalization
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who recognize needs to protect interests other than contract or
property rights. Maybe the time is coming to devise procedures for
private enforcement of transnational law.

The idea of private enforcement of public law emerged in America
in the decades after the Civil War that had torn a fragile nation apart.
Nominal peace came in 1865. Soon thereafter, the rail lines being
laid in every direction united a transcontinental economy serving
populations afflicted with many causes for mutual mistrust. The last
spike driven to complete the first transcontinental road was
designated as the Golden Spike, and it proved to be so.
Manufacturing soon became more important than farming. It took
only a decade or so after the War before numerous capitalist lions
amassed great fortunes, often by exploiting the weaknesses of an
urbanizing lower class. The late 19th century was America’s Gilded
Age. In major respects, the nation was ripe for Marxism. A reason
that Marxism never gained solid traction in America is that Americans
regarded their courthouses as dispensers of justice. And the political
leadership of that time recognized that the regulation of aggressive
capitalists inconsiderate of the interests of fellow citizens could often
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best be done at convenient courthouses in lawsuits brought by
private plaintiffs seeking compensation for harms suffered at the
hands of Big Business.

The first major efforts to regulate practices of Big Business in the new
national economy were the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 2 and
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. 3 An important feature of the latter
law was a provision entitling a plaintiff proving himself to be a victim
of unlawful conduct to be compensated three times over. The stated
aim of triple compensation was to encourage private enforcement of
public law. The Congress of the United States in that enactment
implicitly recognized that the national bureaucracy that would be
needed to enforce such a law effectively was not available, and would
in any case be unable to secure the requisite trust of a public so
divided as America was by region, class, and ethnicity.

The United States has since continued to rely heavily, although
seldom exclusively, on private law enforcers similar to those
encouraged to enforce the antitrust laws. I offer one example from
recent times. 4 In 1996, Shintech, a Japanese subsidiary of Shin
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Etsu, was recruited by the government of the state of Louisiana to
build a factory there. Substantial tax incentives were promised. The
company proposed to build a $700 million polyvinyl chloride plant
in Convent, Louisiana. The plant would consist of three factories and
an incinerator. The governor and the legislature of Louisiana
celebrated the coming of a new source of wealth and jobs.

But Convent is located in the center of “Cancer Alley,” one of the
most polluted communities in America. Its population suffers from a
very high rate of cancer and other medical problems associated with
bad air. The proposed Shintech plant would each year emit an
additional 600,000 pounds of toxic chemicals into the air. As one
might expect, the population residing in Cancer Alley consists largely
of people who cannot afford to live elsewhere. Unsurprisingly, the
population was substantially Afro-American.

The reaction of the people of Convent differed from what one might
expect in a similar situation in other nations. One impoverished but
aggressive African-American female citizen of Convent organized a
lawsuit and went to the courthouse. She and her neighbors sued
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Shintech asking a federal court to prevent construction of its plant as
a violation of federal law. There were of course both state and
federal agencies responsible for protecting the environment. But
none was responsive to the plaintiffs until their lawsuit attracted wide
public notice.

The government of Louisiana was enraged. They not only opposed
the lawsuit but threatened to withdraw public funding for the university
law school if its clinical teacher representing the plaintiffs did not
dismiss the case. The teacher resigned from the university
and continued to represent the plaintiffs, knowing that the federal law
required that he be well compensated by the defendants should he
win the case. 5 The federal agency began to share their concerns.
The outcome was a victory for the plaintiffs. Shintech gave up its
plan to build in Convent.

How was it possible for these impoverished citizens to beat not only
Business but the state and federal governments? The plaintiffs were
able to deploy numerous devices of civil procedure that serve to
empower private plaintiffs serving public aims at the same time that
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they serve their own. Together, these procedural devices can be
seen as a standing invitation to Americans to bring their grievances to
the courthouse. To courthouses that are often architectural events
dominating the landscape, much as cathedrals often dominate
European landscapes.

First of these inviting principles is the American Rule that frees the
plaintiffs from any risk of liability for the defendant’s legal expenses,
even if the plaintiffs suffers an adverse judgment on the merits.
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There is also law allowing lawyers to serve their clients for fees to be
paid only if they succeed, and then only from the proceeds of victory.
And there are statutes, such as federal laws protecting the
environment that require a losing defendant to pay the plaintiff’s
attorney even though no such obligation is imposed on a losing
plaintiff. This is known as the one-way fee shift.

Second, there is the identity of the decision makers at the democratic
courthouse. Most trial judges in America are accountable to voters. 7
And for those who mistrust the judge assigned to their case, there is
generally the right to trial by jury, even in civil cases. 8 Juries,
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whatever their failings, can almost never be bribed or intimidated.
Courthouse decision makers are therefore seldom beholden to a
ruling class. Such courts tend sometimes to be more responsive to
popular concerns than are legislatures or executive officers.

Third, there is public access to information needed to win private
claims enforcing public law. Most information in the hands of
government is available to private plaintiffs. 9 And the discovery rules
familiar to American courts enable plaintiffs to secure not only the
testimony under oath of virtually every adult in the land, but also
access to most files in their possession, including their electronic
files. 10

Fourth, there is the possibility of aggregating the claims of victims, not
only for the sake of efficiency, but also so that lawyers for a group of
lesser claims can hope for sufficient compensation to make it worth
their efforts to engage in vigorous advocacy including vigorous
discovery to present the strongest possible case against public
malefactors. 11 There is also the states’ laws of damages that offers
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compensation for pain and suffering, and the prospect of punitive
damages sufficient to deter repetitive misdeeds.

Partly as a result of these features, there are about a million lawyers
in the United States. Less than a tenth of that number are primarily
devoted to the representation of individual plaintiffs bringing claims
against corporate defendants accused of misdeeds harmful to
workers, consumers, investors, or the environment. A roughly equal
number advise and represent government agencies who share with
them responsibility for the enforcement of laws protecting workers,
consumers, small investors, patients, or the environment. A major
source of employment of the lawyers found in the vast American law
firms is the opportunity to protect Business from private claims that
incidentally serve public, regulatory purposes.

Of course, many business executives protest that American civil
procedure brings forth many false or frivolous claims. The empirical
evidence solidly refutes that claim. 12 Contingent fee lawyers are not
often seen to file claims that are doomed to fail. Defense lawyers
who charge their clients by the hour, on the other hand, frequently are
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found to be presenting weak defenses in which they have invested
many compensable hours of professional services. But few American
businessmen publicly express a desire to be governed by more
congenial European civil procedure if that choice must be
accompanied by European-style bureaucracies fully empowered to
enforce public law.

There would, as I have said, be less need for so many lawyers and
so much dependence on private law enforcement if the United States
were a smaller or more homogeneous nation. That observation
suggests to me that the efforts to globalize the world economy might
possibly profit from a consideration of the American experience.
There are at least two major problems presented by global conditions
that might be thought to call for an American-style system of private
law enforcement on a global scale. Private enforcement is needed
with respect to those matters of transnational import because they,
like the problems of transcontinental import that confounded the
national government of the United States, cannot be plausibly
entrusted to either a global or a local national bureaucracy.
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The two problems I identify are transnational environmental pollution
and the corruption of foreign governments. International laws
addressing either of these problems are unlikely to be effectively
enforced by any world government I am able to imagine, whether a
branch of the United Nations, or of the World Trade Organization, or
of an institution not yet created.

Consider the Kyoto Accord now in force as an international
agreement regarding carbon emissions. Will its standards be
effectively enforced? If so, by whom? Might the lawyer who
represented the citizens of Convent, Louisiana, and others of his sort,
be summoned to perform the task? Lawrence Summers, later the
president of Harvard University, expressed a view shared by many
who possess economic power when he urged that the lethal waste
created by industrial nations should be shipped to poor nations where
the economic consequences of the inevitable biological harms are
less costly. 13 The injustice that results from such practices is
obvious.
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For example, in 2006, Transfigura, a Dutch oil trading firm employed
an Ivory Coast contractor to take hundreds of tons of toxic waste from
the hold of a ship. The cost of removal of the waste in Amsterdam
was said to be perhaps as much as $600,000. To avoid that
expense, the African firm was created and hired for $30,000 to
dispose of the material. It waste was deposited in numerous
locations around Abidjian. 14 At least ten people died as a result, and
about 100,000 people sought medical treatment. Transfigura then
paid the government of Ivory Coast $200 million to settle all claims. 15
Whether the sum paid is realistic compensation for the harm done
and how that money will be used by the government are questions
that abide. We are told that a criminal investigation proceeds in the
Netherlands and that a class action has been filed in Britain on behalf
of thousands of plaintiffs.

This last is an acknowledgment that the American system of private
enforcement of public law is a potentially important device in dealing
with the problems of transnational environmental pollution. The
governments of industrial nations, like those of 19th century American
states, have inadequate incentives to protect those outside their
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boundaries from injuries caused by their own citizens. And the
governments of “developing” nations are too weak and too vulnerable
to bribery or intimidation to protect their environments from harms
caused by malefactors outside their control.

Indeed, consider the problem of transnational corruption. Corruption
is of course a problem in all nations. But it is most serious where it
does the most harm, in those weak and failing states in which public
officials despair of effective public service. In 1974, the United States
made it a crime to bribe an official of a foreign government. 16 Firms
have been prosecuted under that law, and some civil claims have
arisen against firms causing harm by using bribery to get economic
advantages. 17 The Department of State acknowledges that private
civil claims are an essential feature of the American law deterring
bribery of foreign officials. 18 But of course, in the global marketplace
American firms compete with firms from other nations. If an
American firm obeys the law and refuses to pay a bribe, and thereby
loses a business opportunity to a Belgian firm that pays the bribe
requested, the American law may have operated to the disadvantage
of its citizens and its national economy. In 1997, recognizing this

CIVIL PROCEDURE AND TRANSNATIONAL RIGHTS: 14

problem, the United States initiated an international convention
obligating the signing states to enforce criminal laws prohibiting
transnational bribery. 19 And now the United Nations has
promulgated a similar instrument. 20 And the World Bank is seeking
means to prevent the waste of its loans that go into the pockets of
bribed officials. 21

In 2006, controlling transnational corruption is in high fashion in
Europe. 22 But can national governments realistically be expected to
faithfully prosecute and punish their own citizens and businesses for
conduct that is beneficial to their own people, however harmful it may
be to the governments of other lands? There will be some
prosecutions, but I question whether in the end such treaties are
more than benign gestures that acknowledge but do not significantly
relieve the problem of transnational corruption.

Might we be able to create a transnational civil procedure that could
entertain claims made by private plaintiffs who seek compensation for
environmental harms or for economic harms resulting from
transnational bribery? Imagine the plaintiffs drawn from the
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population of a failed state, say Somalia or Haiti or Bangladesh,
whose fragile environment has been sullied by an American firm, or a
Belgian one. Or imagine the plaintiff as a firm that failed to receive a
government contract because a competitor paid by a bribe to the
contract-awarding officials. If a forum were available to hear and
enforce their claims, might it not be expected to resemble in some
respects the democratic courthouses found across the United States?
Would it not be necessary, if effective private enforcement is to be
achieved, to provide abundant economic incentives for the private
lawyers who would seek to enforce environmental rights? Would it
not be equally important to empower private lawyers to thoroughly
investigate possible environmental wrongs or bribery of public
officials? Might it even be wise to engage in decision-making
disinterested persons who have no political or professional ambitions
that might be jeopardized by decisions unwelcome to their own
governments? Could such a process be devised within the present
framework of European institutions so that Somalians or Haitians or
Bangladeshi might be effectively enabled to deter environmental
wrongs committed by European firms? Or so that firms could be
deterred from paying bribes by the knowledge that they are subject to
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suits stripping them of any profits gained as a consequence of such
corrupt payments? Could we not at least confer on European
institutions a duty to enforce judgments rendered in democratic
courthouses on such private claims enforcing international laws?

I have no firm answers to these questions. I mean only to suggest
the possibility that there may be lessons to learn from the American
experience. The United States cannot be said to have found in its
experience governing an interstate economy the solutions to the
problems of transnational pollution and corruption, but it has perhaps
identified the issues to be considered if either of these cosmic
problems are ever to be effectively addressed. The reader is invited
to join in such a consideration.

CIVIL PROCEDURE AND TRANSNATIONAL RIGHTS: 17

NOTES
*

Professor of Law, Duke University.

1

Herta Daeubler-Gmelin was German Minister of Justice from 1998 to 2002. Her
comment was reported by the Associated Press on September 19, 2002.
2

Act of February 4, 1887, 24 Stat. 379.

3

Act of July 2, 1890, 26 Stat. §§209, 210 codified as 15 U.S.C. §§1-15.

4

For an account of this case, see Robert R. Kuehn, Denying Access to Legal
Representation: The Attack on the Tulane Environmental Law Clinic, 4 Wash. U. J. L. & Policy 33
(2000).
5

42 U.S.C. §7604. This device of the one-way fee shift was first employed in the laws of
many states enacted in the 19th century. John Leubsdorf. Toward A History of the American Rule
on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47-1 Law & Contemp. Prob. 9 (1984). For an account of the use of
the device in environmental laws, see James T. Blanch et al, Citizen Suits and Qui Tam Actions:
Private Enforcement of Public Policy (Washington 1996).
6

E.g. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796); Act of February 26, 1853, 10 Stat. 161;
see generally Leubsdorf, note 4.
7

For a collection of essays depicting the practice of electing judges and the problems
that practice presents, see Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability 61-1 Law and
Contemporary Problems (Paul D. Carrington & D. Price Marshall eds., 1999).
8

On the state of the civil jury, see Randolph M. Jonakaitm The American Jury System
(New Haven 2003); Ellen E. Sward, The Decline of the Civil Jury (Durham 2001).
9

See, e.g. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §§551 et seq.

10

F.R. Civ.P. 26-37, 45. On the secondary consequences of discovery, see Stephen V.
Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis. L. Rev. 631.
11

The device of the class actions as an instrument of private enforcement of public law
was first proposed by Harry Kalven & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Action, 8 U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941). It is authorized by F.R.Civ.P. 23. On consideration of
the practice in other legal systems, see Debates Over Group Litigation in Comparative
Perspecitve: What Can We Learn from Each Other? 11 Duke J. Comp. & Intl. L 157 (2001).
12

See Marc Galanter, Vanishing Trials: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
State and Federal Courts, 1 J. Empirical Legal Studies 459 (2004).
13

His Memorandum of Chief Economist, World Bank December 12, 1991 is celebrated
on the internet.
14

Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Global Sludge Ends in Tragedy for Ivory Coast,
New York Times, October 2, 2006.
15

Lydia Polgreen & Marlise Simons, Oil Company to Pay $200 Million in Toxic Dumping
in Ivory Coast, New York Times, February 15, 2007 at A9.

CIVIL PROCEDURE AND TRANSNATIONAL RIGHTS: 18

16

United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. 15 U.S.C. §78-dd.1, first enacted in
1977, 91 Stat. 1494.
17

E.g. W. S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectronics Corp. 493 U.S. 400 (1990).

18

Department of State Review of Implementation of the Convention (2001),
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rpts/bib/36587.htm.
19

Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, (entered into force Nov. 10, 1998), 112 Stat. 3311.
20

21

22

United Nations Convention Against Corruption (2002).
See http://web.worldbank.org/website,externaltopics.

Carter Dougherty, Germany Battling Rising Tide of Corporate Corruption, New York
Times, February 15, 2007 at C1.

